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Abstract
Because learning sometimes involves sensitive data, machine learning algorithms
have been extended to offer privacy for training data. In practice, this has been
mostly an afterthought, with privacy-preserving models obtained by re-running
training with a different optimizer, but using the model architectures that already
performed well in a non-privacy-preserving setting. This approach leads to less
than ideal privacy/utility tradeoffs, as we show here. Instead, we propose that
model architectures are chosen ab initio explicitly for privacy-preserving training.
To provide guarantees under the gold standard of differential privacy, one must
bound as strictly as possible how individual training points can possibly affect
model updates. In this paper, we are the first to observe that the choice of activation
function is central to bounding the sensitivity of privacy-preserving deep learning.
We demonstrate analytically and experimentally how a general family of bounded
activation functions, the tempered sigmoids, consistently outperform unbounded
activation functions like ReLU. Using this paradigm, we achieve new state-of-the-
art accuracy on MNIST, FashionMNIST, and CIFAR10 without any modification
of the learning procedure fundamentals or differential privacy analysis.
1 Introduction
Machine learning (ML) can be usefully applied to the analysis of sensitive data, e.g., in the domain of
healthcare [13]. However, ML models may unintentionally reveal sensitive aspects of their training
data, e.g., due to overfitting [18, 19]. To counter this, ML techniques that offer strong guarantees
expressed in the framework of differential privacy [9] have been developed. A seminal example is the
differentially private stochastic gradient descent, or DP-SGD, of Abadi et al. [1]. The technique is a
generally-applicable modification of stochastic gradient descent. In addition to its rigorous privacy
guarantees, it has been empirically shown to stop known attacks against the privacy of training data;
a representative example being the leaking of secrets [6].
Beyond privacy, training using DP-SGD offers advantages such as strong generalization and the
promise of reusable holdouts [12, 10]. Yet, its advantages have not been without cost: empirically, the
test accuracy of differentially private ML is consistently lower than that of non-private learning (e.g.,
see [17]). Such accuracy loss may sometimes be inevitable: for example, the task may involve heavy-
tailed distributions and noise added by DP-SGD hinders visibility of examples in the tails [11, 4].
However, this does not explain the accuracy loss of differentially private ML on benchmarks that are
known to be relatively simple when learning without privacy: e.g., MNIST [22], FashionMNIST [21],
and CIFAR10 [14].
An important step in providing differential privacy guarantees for an algorithm is to assess its
sensitivity. A learning algorithm’s sensitivity characterizes how much an individual training point
can, in the worst case, affect the learning algorithm’s outputs (i.e., values of the model parameters).
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The ability to more strictly bound sensitivity leads to stronger privacy guarantees. To strictly bound
the impact of any training example, DP-SGD makes two changes to every step of gradient-descent
optimization: first, each example’s gradient contribution is limited to a fixed bound (in practice, by
clipping all per-example gradients to a maximum `2 norm); second, random (Gaussian) noise of the
scale of the clipping norm is added to each batch’s combined gradient, before it is backpropagated to
update model parameters. Together, these changes create a new, artificial noise floor at each step of
gradient descent, such that the unique signal of any individual example is below this new noise floor;
this allows differential privacy to be guaranteed for all training examples [9].
This paper is the first to observe that DP-SGD leads to exploding model activations as a deep neural
network’s training progresses. This makes it difficult to control the training algorithm’s sensitivity at a
minimal impact to its correctness. Indeed, exploding activations cause unclipped gradient magnitudes
to also increase, which in turn induces an information loss once the clipping operation is applied to
bound gradient magnitudes. This exacerbates the negative impact of noise calibrated to the clipping
bound, thus degrading the utility of each gradient step when learning with privacy. Indeed, the
gradient clipping of DP-SGD does not bring the nice properties of gradient clipping commonly used
to regularize deep learning [23] because DP-SGD clips gradients at the granularity of individual
training examples rather than at the level of a batch.
We thus hypothesize that activation functions need to be bounded when learning with DP-SGD. We
propose that neural architectures for private learning employ a general family of bounded activations:
tempered sigmoids. We note that prior work has explored tempered losses as a means to provide
robustness to noise during training [2]. Because the family of tempered sigmoids can—in the limit—
represent an approximation of ReLUs [16] on the subset of their domain that is exercised in training,
we expect that our approach will perform no worse than current architectures. These architectures
use ReLUs as the de facto choice of activation function.
Through both analysis and experiments, we validate the significantly superior performance of
tempered sigmoids when training neural networks with DP-SGD. In our analysis, we relate the
role of the temperature parameter in tempered sigmoids to the clipping operation of DP-SGD. Unlike
prior work, which attempted to adapt the clipping norm to the gradients of each layer’s parameters
post hoc to training [15], we find that tempered sigmoids preserve more of the signal contained
in gradients of each layer because they rescale each layer’s activations and better predispose the
corresponding layer’s gradients to clipping. We conclude that using tempered sigmoids is a better
default activation function choice for private ML.
In summary, our contributions facilitate DP-SGD learning as follows:
• We analytically show in Section 3 how tempered sigmoid activations control the gradient
norm explicitly, and in turn support faster convergence in the settings of differentially private
ML, by eliminating the negative effects of clipping and noising large gradients.
• To demonstrate empirically the superior performance of tempered sigmoids, we show in
Section 5.1 how using tempered sigmoids instead of ReLU activations significantly improves
a model’s private-learning suitability and achievable privacy/accuracy tradeoffs.
• We advance the state-of-the-art of deep learning with differential privacy for MNIST,
FashionMNIST, and CIFAR10. On these datasets, we find in Section 5.2 that the parameter
setting in which tempered sigmoids perform best happens to correspond to the tanh function.
On MNIST, our model achieves 98.1% test accuracy for a privacy guarantee of (ε, δ) =
(2.93, 10−5), whereas the previous state-of-the-art reported in the TensorFlow Privacy
library [12] was 96.6%. On FashionMNIST, we obtain 86.1% test accuracy compared to
81.9% for (ε, δ) = (2.7, 10−5). Finally, on CIFAR10, we achieve 66.2% test accuracy at
(ε, δ) = (7.53, 10−5) in a setup for which prior work achieved 61.6%.
2 Training-data Memorization, Differential Privacy, and DP-SGD
Machine learning models easily memorize sensitive, personal, or private data that was used in their
training, and models may in practice disclose this data—as demonstrated by membership inference
attacks [18] and secret extraction results [19, 6].
To reason about the privacy guarantees of algorithms such as training by stochastic gradient descent,
differential privacy has become the established gold standard [9]. Informally, an algorithm is
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differentially private if it always produces effectively the same output (in a mathematically precise
sense), when applied to two input datasets that differ by only one record. Formally, a learning
algorithm A that trains models from the set S is (ε, δ)-differentially-private, if the following holds
for all training datasets d and d′ that differ by exactly one record:
Pr[A(d) ∈ S] ≤ eε Pr[A(d′) ∈ S] + δ (1)
Here, ε gives the formal privacy guarantee, by placing a strong upper bound on any privacy loss, even
in the worst possible case. A lower ε indicates a stronger privacy guarantee or a tighter upper bound.
The factor δ allows for some probability that the property may not hold (in practice, this δ is required
to be very small, e.g., in inverse proportion to the dataset size).
A very attractive property of differential-privacy guarantees is that they hold true for all attackers—
whatever they are probing and whatever their prior knowledge—and that they remain true under
various forms of composition. In particular, the output of a differentially-private algorithm can be
arbitrarily post processed, without any weakening of the guarantees. Also, if sensitive training data
contains multiple examples from the same person (or, more generally, the same sensitive group), ε-
differentially-private training on this data will result in model with a kε-differential-privacy guarantee
for each person, as long as at most k training-data records are present per person.
Abadi et al. [1] introduced DP-SGD as a method for training deep neural networks with differential-
privacy guarantees that was able to achieve better privacy and utility than previous efforts [7, 20, 5].
DP-SGD bounds the sensitivity of the learning process to each individual training example by
computing per-example gradients {gi}i∈0..n−1 with respect to the loss, for the n model parameters
{θi}i∈0..n−1, and clipping each per-example gradient to a maximum fixed `2 norm C: Subsequently,
to the average of these per-example gradients, DP-SGD adds (Gaussian) noise whose standard
deviation σ is proportional to this sensitivity. In this work, we use the canonical implementation of
DP-SGD and its associated analysis from the TensorFlow Privacy library [12].
3 Approach
When training a model with differential privacy, gradients computed during SGD are computed
individually for each example (i.e., the gradient computation is not averaged across all samples
contained in a minibatch). The gradient gi for each model parameter θi is then clipped such that the
total l2 norm of the gradient across all parameters is bounded by C:
gi ← gi ·min
1, C√∑n−1
i=0 g
2
i
 (2)
Because this operation is performed on per-example gradients, this allows DP-SGD to control the
sensitivity of learning to individual training examples. However, this clipping operation will lead to
information loss when some of the signal contained in gradients is discarded because the magnitude
of gradients is too large. One way to reduce the magnitude (or at least control it), is to prevent the
model’s activations from exploding. This is one of the reasons why common design choices for the
architecture of modern deep neural networks make it difficult to optimize model parameters with
DP-SGD: prominent activation functions like the REctified Linear Unit (ReLU) are unbounded.
We hypothesize that replacing ReLUs with a bounded activation function prevents activations from
exploding and thus keeps the magnitude of gradients to a more reasonable value. This in turn implies
that, given a fixed level of privacy guarantee, the clipping operation applied by DP-SGD will discard
less signal from gradient updates—eventually resulting in higher performance at test time.
Tempered sigmoids. Based on this intuition, we propose replacing the unbounded activations
typically used in deep neural networks with a general family of bounded activations: the tempered
sigmoids. We note that an idea that is conceptually close to ours, the use of tempered losses, was
recently found to provide robustness to noise during training [2].2 Tempered sigmoids are the family
of functions that take the form of:
φs,T,o : x 7→ s
1 + e−T ·x
− o (3)
2We experimented with the tempered loss of [2] but did not find any improvements for DP-SGD training.
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where s controls the scale of the activation, T is the inverse temperature, and o is the offset. By
decreasing the value of s, we reduce the magnitude of a neuron’s activation. Complementary to this,
the inverse temperature rescales a neuron’s weighted inputs. We note that setting s = 2, T = 2, and
o = 1 in particular yields the tanh function exactly, i.e., we have φ2,2,1 = tanh.
4 2 0 2 4
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2
3
4 s=2, T=2, o=1 (tanh)
s=5, T=2, o=1
s=2, T=6, o=1
s=2, T=2, o=0
Figure 1: Tempered sigmoids: we plot examples for representative values of the scale s, inverse
temperature T , and offset o. The blue line corresponds to the parameter triplet (s = 2, T = 2, o = 1)
where the tempered sigmoid is exactly a tanh.
Controlling the gradient norm with tempered sigmoids. One of the main issues in practice with
DP-SGD is tuning the value of the clipping parameter:
• If C is set too low, then clipping introduces bias by changing the underlying objective
optimized during learning.
• Instead if the clipping parameter C is set too high, clipping increases variance by forcing
DP-SGD to add too much noise. Indeed, recall that DP-SGD adds Gaussian noise with
variance σ2 to the average of (clipped) per-example gradients. This noise is scaled to
the clipping norm such that σ2 = M2C2 where M is a hyperparameter called the noise
multiplier. Thus, large clipping norms lead to noise with large variance being added to the
average gradient before it is applied to update model parameters.
It turns out that the temperature parameter T in Equation (3) can be used as a knob to control the
norm of the gradient of the loss function, and with an appropriate choice avoids these two issues of
clipping. In the following, we formalize the relationship between our tempered sigmoids and the
clipping of DP-SGD in the context of the binary logistic loss and its multiclass counterpart.
Consider the tempered logistic loss: `(θ; z, y) = ln (1 + exp(−y · T · 〈z, θ〉)), where z, θ ∈ Rd,
y ∈ {−1,+1}, and T ∈ R is the inverse temperature. Notice that the above expression is an
instantiation of ln (1/φs,T,o), where s = 1 and x = y · 〈z, θ〉. Now, if we take the gradient of ` w.r.t
θ, we have the following for the `2-norm of the gradient.
‖∇θ`‖2 =
∥∥∥∥ −T · y · z1 + exp(T · y · 〈z, θ〉)
∥∥∥∥
2
≤ |T | · ‖z‖2 (4)
We observe the following two things from (4): i) Controlling T directly controls the norm of the
gradient of `, and hence controls clipping norm in general (when using tempered sigmoid as an
activation), ii) Specifically, for logistic loss, T can be thought of as linear scaling of the feature
vector z, when the point (z, y) is “grossly misclassified”. These observations suggest that one can
use the inverse temperature to control the norm of the gradient, and may not ever cross the “clipping
threshold” in DP-SGD.
One can extend this observations to multiclass logistic loss `(θ; z, y) = ln
(
exp(T ·〈z,θy〉)∑
j∈1..k exp(T ·〈z,θj〉)
)
where y is now a one-hot label vector and θ ∈ Rd×k for a problem with k classes. The partial gradient
of ` w.r.t. θm, for any class m ∈ 1..k, becomes:
∂θm` =
(
1m=y − exp(T · 〈z, θm〉)∑
j∈1..k exp(T · 〈z, θj〉)
)
· T · z (5)
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Because the norm of the expression in parenthesis is smaller than 1, we thus have that ‖∂θm`‖2 ≤ |T |·‖x‖2. From this we derive that the norm of the gradient ∇θ` = [∂θ1 . . . ∂θk ] would correspondingly
be bound by
√
k · ‖∂θm`‖2 ≤
√
k · |T | · ‖z‖2, where k is the number of classes.
4 Experimental Setup
We use three common benchmarks for differentially private ML: MNIST, FashionMNIST, and
CIFAR10. While the three datasets are considered as “solved” in the computer vision community,
achieving high utility with strong privacy guarantees remains difficult on all three datasets [1,
12]. Concretely, the state-of-the-art for MNIST is a test accuracy of 96.6% given an (ε, δ) =
(2.93, 10−5) differential privacy guarantee. With stronger guarantees, the accuracy continues to
degrade. In the same privacy-preserving settings, prior approaches achieve a test accuracy of 81.9%
on FashionMNIST. For CIFAR10, a test accuracy of 61.6% can be achieved given an (ε, δ) =
(7.53, 10−5) differential privacy guarantee.
All of our experiments are performed with the JAX framework in Python, on a machine equipped with
a 5th generation Intel Xeon processor and NVIDIA V100 GPU acceleration. For both MNIST and
FaashionMNIST, we use a convolutional neural network whose architecture is described in Table 1.
For CIFAR10, we use the deeper model in Table 2. The choice of architectures is motivated by prior
work which showed that training larger architectures is detrimental to generalization when learning
with privacy [5]. This can be explained in two ways. Given a fixed privacy guarantee, increasing the
number of parameters increases (a) how much each parameter needs to be clipped relatively and (b)
how much noise needs to be added, with the norm of noise increasing as a function of the square root
of the number of parameters.
When we train these architectures with ReLU activations for both the convolution and fully-connected
layers, we are able to exactly reproduce the previous state-of-the-art results mentioned above for
MNIST, FashionMNIST, and CIFAR10. To experiment with the tempered sigmoid proposed in
Section 3, we implement it in JAX and use it in lieu of the ReLU in the architecture from Table 1
and Table 2. Our code is staged for an open-source release, and we include the code snippet for the
tempered sigmoid activation below—to demonstrate the practicality of implementing the change we
propose in neural architectures.
from jax.scipy.special import expit
def tempered_sigmoid(x, scale=2., inverse_temp=2., offset=1., axis=-1):
return scale * expit(inverse_temp * x) - offset
def elementwise(fun, **fun_kwargs):
"""Layer that applies a scalar function elementwise on its inputs."""
init_fun = lambda rng, input_shape: (input_shape, ())
apply_fun = lambda params, inputs, **kwargs: fun(inputs, **fun_kwargs)
return init_fun, apply_fun
TemperedSigmoid = elementwise(tempered_sigmoid, axis=-1)
Layer Parameters
Convolution 16 filters of 8x8, strides 2
Max-Pooling 2x2
Convolution 32 filters of 4x4, strides 2
Max-Pooling 2x2
Fully connected 32 units
Softmax 10 units
Table 1: Convolutional model architecture.
Layer Parameters
Convolution ×2 32 filters of 3× 3, strides 1
Avg-Pooling 2× 2, stride 2
Convolution ×2 64 filters of 3× 3, strides 1
Avg-Pooling 2× 2, stride 2
Convolution ×2 128 filters of 3× 3, strides 1
Avg-Pooling 2× 2, stride 2
Convolution 256 filters of 3× 3, strides 1
Convolution 10 filters of 3× 3, strides 1
Averaging over spatial dimensions
Table 2: CIFAR10 model architecture.
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5 Evaluating the family of tempered activation functions
5.1 Improved privacy-utility tradeoffs with tempered sigmoids
For each of the three datasets considered, we use DP-SGD to train a pair of models. The first model
uses ReLU whereas the second model uses a tempered sigmoid φs,T,o as the activation for all of
its hidden layers (i.e., both convolutional and fully-connected layers). The models are based off
the architecture of Table 1 for MNIST and FashionMNIST, or Table 2 for CIFAR10. All other
architectural elements are kept identical. In our experiments, we subsequently fine-tuned architectural
aspects (i.e., model capacity) as well as the choice of optimizer and its associated hyperparameters,
separately for the activation function in each setting (ReLU and tempered sigmoid), to avoid favoring
any one choice.
Recall from Section 3 that tempered sigmoids φs,T,o are bounded activations that are parameterized
such that their inputs and output can be rescaled—through the inverse temperature T and scale s
parameters respectively—and their output recentered with the offset o. Tempered sigmoids help
control the norm of the gradient of the loss function, and in turn mitigate some of the negative effects
from clipping. In Figure 2, we visualize the influence of the scale s, inverse temperature T , and offset
o on the test performance of models trained with DP-SGD and tempered sigmoids φs,T,o.
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Figure 2: Test accuracy of architectures with tempered sigmoids φs,T,o as a function the scale s,
inverse temperature T , and offset o. Results are plotted for MNIST, FashionMNIST, and CIFAR10
from left to right. All models are trained with DP-SGD.
Tempered sigmoids significantly outperform models trained with ReLU on all three datasets. On
MNIST, the best tempered sigmoid achieves 98.1% test accuracy whereas the baseline ReLU model
trained to provide identical privacy guarantees (ε = 2.93) achieved 96.6% accuracy. This contributes
to bridging the gap between privacy-preserving learning and non-private learning, which results in
a test accuracy of 99.0% for this architecture with both ReLU and tanh. On FashionMNIST, we
achieve a best performing model of 86.0% with tempered sigmoids in comparison with 81.9% with
ReLUs. A non-private model achieves 89.3% with tanh and 89.4% with ReLUs. On CIFAR10, the
best tempered sigmoid architectures achieve 66.0% test accuracy whereas the ReLU variant obtained
61.6% under the same privacy guarantees and the non-private baseline 76.6%.
From Figure 2, it appears clearly that a subset of tempered sigmoids performs best when learning
with DP-SGD on the three datasets we considered. These form a cluster of points (s, T, o) which
result in models with significantly higher test accuracy. These points are colored in dark green.
For each dataset, we compute the average value of the 10% best-performing triplets (s, T, o). On
MNIST, the average triplet obtained is (s, T, o) = (1.97, 2.27, 1.15), on FashionMNIST (s, T, o) =
(2.27, 2.61, 1.28), and on CIFAR10 (s, T, o) = (1.58, 3.00, 0.71). While this observation may not
hold for other datasets, it is thus interesting to note here how these values happen to be close to
the triplet setting (s, T, o) = (2, 2, 1) for MNIST and FashionMNIST—and to a lesser extent for
CIFAR10. Recall that this setting corresponds exactly to the tanh function. For this reason, we
explore the particular case of tanh next. We seek to understand whether it is able to sustain the
significant improvements of tempered sigmoids over ReLU for the datasets we considered.
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5.2 Improving the state-of-the-art on MNIST, FashionMNIST, and CIFAR10 with tanh
We now turn to the particular case of the tanh function to understand the broader implications of our
results from Section 5.1 for the three datasets considered: MNIST, FashionMNIST, and CIFAR10.
In the following experiment, we find that for these datasets positive results observed on the general
family of tempered sigmoids can be reproduced with tanh alone, which is obtained by setting
s = 2, T = 2, and o = 1 in φs,T,o. One of the reasons we focus on the particular example of tanh is
that changing the activation function to a tanh does not introduce new hyperparameters in learning:
the values of s, T, o need not be tuned if we choose to train architectures with a tanh.
Comparing performance. The tanh was an improvement on all three datasets and its performance
is in line with the best test accuracy observed across tempered sigmoids on Figure 2. The test accuracy
of the tanh model is 98.0% on MNIST, 85.5% on FashionMNIST, and 63.84% on CIFAR10. Figure 3
visualizes the privacy-utility Pareto curve [3] of the ReLU and tanh models trained with DP-SGD for
all three datasets. Rather than plotting the test accuracy as a function of the number of steps, we plot
it as a function of the privacy loss ε (but the privacy loss is a monotonically increasing function of the
number of steps). The tanh models outperform their ReLU counterparts consistently regardless of
the privacy loss ε expended.
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Figure 3: Test accuracy as a function of the privacy loss when training a pair of models with DP-SGD
on MNIST, FashionMNIST, and CIFAR10 (left to right). The only difference between the two models
is the activation function for their hidden layer: ReLU or tanh. All other elements of the architecture
(number, type, and dimension of layers) and the training algorithm (optimizer, learning rate, number
of microbatches, clipping norm, and noise multiplier) are identical. Results averaged over 10 runs.
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Figure 4: `2 norm of the first conv activa-
tions. Three scenarios are plotted: (a) the
model is trained without privacy using plain
SGD, (b) the model is trained with ReLU ac-
tivations with DP-SGD, and (c) the model is
trained with tanh activations with DP-SGD.
Impact of tanh on activation norms. To explain
why a simple change of activation functions has such
a large positive impact on the model’s accuracy, we
conjectured that the bounded nature of the tanh, and
more generally tempered sigmoids, prevents activa-
tions from exploding during training.
We monitored the `2 norm of the first layer’s activa-
tions for our MNIST model while it is being trained in
three scenarios: (a) without privacy using vanilla SGD
and ReLU activations, (b) with ReLU activations and
DP-SGD, and (c) with tanh activations and DP-SGD.
Activation norms on test data are visualized in Fig-
ure 4. As conjectured in Section 3, the activations of
our ReLU model explode by a factor of 3when training
with privacy compared to without privacy. Switching
to tanh brings down the norms of activations back
to levels comparable with the activations of our non-
private ReLU network. This helps us to learn with
privacy—because it eliminates the negative effects of
clipping and noising large gradients. By predisposing
gradients to the operations performed by DP-SGD, less information is lost: the norm of unclipped
gradients is closer to the clipping norm, and is also more adequate to the noise scale. We observe the
same qualitative differences on other datasets, but do not repeat the plots due to space constraints.
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Fine-tuning the optimizer. To ensure that the comparison between ReLU and tempered sigmoids
is fair, we now turn our attention to the training algorithm itself and verify that the superior behavior
of tanh holds after a thorough hyperparameter search: this includes the number of filters k, learning
rate, optimizer, batch size, and number of epochs. We find that it is important to tailor algorithm
and hyperparameter choices to the specificities of private learning: an optimizer or learning rate that
yields good results without privacy may not perform well with privacy. Among the hyperparameters
mentioned above, it is particularly important to fine-tune the learning rate to maximize performance
given a fixed privacy budget. This is because the privacy budget limits the number of steps we can
possibly take on the training set (as visualized on Figure 3). For example, Table 3 shows how learning
rates obtained through a hyperparameter search based on Batched Gaussian Process Bandits [8] vary
across the non-DP and DP settings when training on FashionMNIST, but that the choice of optimizer
(and in particular whether it is adaptive or not) does not influence results as much.
Non-private Differentially-private
Optimizer Epochs Learning Rate Test Accuracy Learning Rate Test Accuracy
SGD 40 1.07 · 10−1 90.3% 3.32 · 10−1 86.1%
Adam 40 1.06 · 10−3 90.5% 1.32 · 10−3 86.0%
Table 3: Impact of learning rate on trade-off between accuracy and privacy. The privacy budget is
fixed to ε = 2.7 for all rows. A hyperparameter search is then conducted to find the best learning rate
to train the model with or without differential privacy on FashionMNIST.
Table 4 summarizes the results after performing this hyperparameter search for each of the three
datasets considered in our experiments. We compare the non-private baseline and the DP-SGD
with ReLU baseline to our DP-SGD approach with tempered sigmoids (instantiated by tanh here
on our three datasets) after all hyperparameters have been jointly fined-tuned. Even in their own
individually-best setting, tempered sigmoids continue to consistently outperform ReLU with 98.1%
test accuracy (instead of 96.6% for ReLU) on MNIST, 86.1% test accuracy (instead of 81.9% for
ReLU) on FashionMNIST, 66.2% test accuracy (instead of 61.6% for ReLU) on CIFAR10.
Dataset Technique Acc. ε δ
MNIST
SGD w/ ReLU (not private) 99.0% ∞ 0
DP-SGD w/ ReLU 96.6% 2.93 10−5
DP-SGD w/ tempered sigmoid (tanh) [ours] 98.1% 2.93 10−5
FashionMNIST
SGD w/ ReLU (not private) 89.4% ∞ 0
DP-SGD w/ ReLU 81.9% 2.7 10−5
DP-SGD w/ tempered sigmoid (tanh) [ours] 86.1% 2.7 10−5
CIFAR10
SGD w/ ReLU (not private) 76.6% ∞ 0
DP-SGD w/ ReLU 61.6% 7.53 10−5
DP-SGD w/ tempered sigmoid (tanh) [ours] 66.2% 7.53 10−5
Table 4: Summary of results comparing ReLU to tempered sigmoids (represented here by the tanh)
in their respective best performing setting (i.e., each row is the result of a hyperparameter search).
6 Conclusions
Rather than first train a non-private model and later attempt to make it private, we bypass non-
private training altogether and directly incorporate specificities of private learning in the selection of
activation functions. Selecting a tempered sigmoid as the activation function renders the architecture
more suitable for learning with differential privacy. This improves substantially upon the state-of-
the-art privacy/accuracy trade-offs on three benchmarks which remain challenging for deep learning
with differential privacy: MNIST, FashionMNIST, and CIFAR10. Future work may continue to
explore this avenue: model architectures need to be chosen explicitly for privacy-preserving training
We expect that in addition to activation functions studied in our work, other architectural aspects
can be modified to further reduce the observed gap in performance of private learning compared to
non-private learning. In addition, choosing the parameters (s, T, o) to be shared across all layers was
not a necessity. We found that layer-wise parameters did not improve results on our datasets, but it
may be the case for different tasks: this is related to the idea of setting layer-wise clipping norms [15].
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Broader impact
Our work helps make privacy-preserving training more practical. Our analysis and experimental
results help practitioners make better choices when design neural architectures for privacy-preserving
deep learning. In particular, the conclusions from our paper can readily be applied in real-world
machine learning pipelines. For this reason, we expect the broader impact of this work to be generally
positive given the numerous applications of machine learning to sensitive datasets. This includes
applications in domains like healthcare or language modeling.
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